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Abstract
We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element prop-
erty” where for each agent, there exists a strategy proﬁle that gives him
the highest payoﬀ in the mechanism. This class includes ﬁnite and regular
mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions
of available suﬃciency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some
mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed.
We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in
environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be im-
mune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility.
In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementa-
tion by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive
than previously thought.
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1 Introduction
Aside from incentive compatibility, the necessary conditions for implemen-
tation in iteratively undominated strategies are typically viewed as very per-
missive.1 For example, in a standard Bayesian environment with incomplete
information, in which type spaces are common knowledge, Abreu and Mat-
sushima [1] [AM, henceforth] show that both incentive compatibility and
their measurability condition (referred to as AM measurability from now
on) are necessary for (exact or approximate) implementation in iteratively
undominated strategies. Incentive compatibility is the central restriction in
the economic theory of information, and it can sometimes be quite demand-
ing. However, as argued for instance in AM or in Serrano and Vohra [14],
AM measurability is usually very weak: interim preferences of the diﬀerent
types are almost always distinct from each other, and then AM measurabil-
ity amounts to no restriction at all. These necessity results are generalized
to robust environments, in which weaker common knowledge requirements
are made, in Bergemann and Morris [3] [BM from now on] and in Artemov,
Kunimoto and Serrano [2] [AKS in the sequel].
In the three papers afore mentioned (AM, BM and AKS), additional
conditions are used to prove the corresponding suﬃciency results. AM’s
Assumption 2 states that, for each agent i and each state, there exist two
ex-post lotteries that i ranks strictly, and for which all other agents have the
(weakly) opposite ranking. BM make use of an economic assumption, which
is essentially a robust analogue of AM’s Assumption 2. Because of their
robustness considerations, BM require that for each agent i, there exists a
constant lottery zi that i strictly prefers to the uniform lottery y¯, and for
which all other agents have the (weakly) opposite preferences, regardless
of the underlying payoﬀ types. Finally, AKS essentially postulate that the
set of alternatives includes a numeraire, on which an arbitrarily small oﬀ-
equilibrium penalty can be imposed. As a nice byproduct, these papers
obtain suﬃciency results using finite mechanisms, in which best responses
always exist. In all three cases, the use of these assumptions in the suﬃciency
proofs is seemingly minor (only to employ inﬁnitesimal punishments out of
equilibrium). Thus, one might have thought that such conditions could be
dispensed with and that new proofs of the authors’ suﬃciency results could
be written without the aid of such assumptions.
In this paper, we show that such assumptions cannot be dropped if we
restrict our attention to mechanisms satisfying the best element property:
in a mechanism with this property, for each agent, there always exists a
strategy proﬁle that gives him the highest payoﬀ in the mechanism. Note
that ﬁnite mechanisms and regular mechanisms (See AM [1] for its formal
1Here, “iteratively undominated strategies” refers to the iterative removal of strictly domi-
nated strategies.
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deﬁnition), which essentially require that best responses always exist, satisfy
the best element property. Moreover, the best element property holds even
in any mechanism that relies on a “standard” integer game where each agent
has to announce an integer and can choose his best outcome if his integer
is the highest. Standard integer games are often used in implementation
theory (See Maskin [12] for example) and so, our results encompass such
non-regular mechanisms as well.
Indeed, we uncover a new necessary condition, previously overlooked,
that must be added. We term it restricted deception-proofness. It says that
in environments in which preferences are identical across agents, the social
choice function (SCF) must be immune to all manipulations via deceptions.
As such, the condition is then stronger than incentive compatibility and
sometimes strictly so, leading to a new restriction on the (exactly or approx-
imately) implementable SCFs in iteratively undominated strategies. Con-
sidered by itself, restricted deception-proofness can be substantially more
restrictive than AM measurability or the conditions of virtual monotonic-
ity and its mixed counterpart (the latter two found in Serrano and Vohra
[14, 15]. Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux [5] and Serrano and Vohra [14, 15]
use what we call a stochastic integer game as part of their implementing
mechanisms. In a stochastic integer game, each agent has to announce an
integer; the higher an integer he announces the higher the probability with
which he can choose his best outcome; but, no matter how high an integer
he announces, he cannot obtain his best outcome with probability 1. If an
SCF f violates restricted deception-proofness, any implementing mechanism
(e.g., the ones mentioned relying on stochastic integer games) cannot satisfy
the best element property.2 This explains our restriction on the class of
mechanisms employed. We shall provide an example, which has appeared
previously in the literature, to illustrate our points.
We study incomplete information environments. Two papers containing
some related results for the complete information domain are Bo¨rgers [6] and
Bergemann and Morris [4]. Bergemann and Morris [4] show a similar result
for virtual implementation by ﬁnite mechanisms under complete information.
Bo¨rgers [6] obtains an impossibility result under complete information when
only deterministic ﬁnite mechanisms are allowed and all possible identical
(strict) preferences are included in the domain of SCFs. We will discuss
connections of our work to Bo¨rgers [6] at the end of the paper.
2In fact, Bergemann, Morris, and Tercieux [5] show in their Proposition 2 that no assumptions
that amount to quasilinearity are needed for exact implementation in iteratively undominated
strategies under complete information. We conjecture that a result similar to their Proposition
2 can be proven in incomplete information environments.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote the set of agents and Θi be the set of ﬁnite types
of agent i. Denote Θ ≡ Θ1 × · · · ×Θn, and Θ−i ≡ Θ1 × · · · ×Θi−1 ×Θi+1 ×
· · · ×Θn.3 Let qi(θ−i|θi) denote agent i’s belief that other agents receive the
proﬁle of types θ−i when his type is θi.
Let A denote the set of pure outcomes, which are assumed to be inde-
pendent of the information state. For simplicity, suppose A = {a1, . . . , aK}
is ﬁnite. Let Δ(A) denote the set of probability distributions on A.
Agent i’s state dependent von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function is
denoted ui : Δ(A)×Θ → R.
We can now deﬁne an environment as E = (A, {ui,Θi, qi}i∈N ), which is
implicitly understood to be common knowledge among the agents.
A social choice function (SCF) is a function f : Θ → Δ(A). The in-
terim expected utility of agent i of type θi, who pretends to be of type θ′i,
corresponding to an SCF f is deﬁned as:
Ui(f ; θ′i|θi) ≡
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui(f(θ′i, θ−i)); (θi, θ−i)).
Denote Ui(f |θi) = Ui(f ; θi|θi).
A mechanism Γ = ((Mi)i∈N , g) describes a (nonempty) message space
Mi for agent i and an outcome function g : M → Δ(A), where M = ×i∈NMi.
Let σi : Θi → Mi denote a (pure) strategy for agent i and Σi his set of pure
strategies. Let
Ui(g ◦ σ|θi) ≡
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui(g(σ(θ−i, θi)); (θ−i, θi)).
Given a mechanism Γ = (M,g), let Hi be a subset of Σi.4
Definition 1 (Strict Dominance) A strategy σi ∈ Hi is strictly domi-
nated for agent i with respect to H = ×j∈NHj if there exist θi ∈ Θi and
σ
′
i ∈ Σi such that for every σ−i ∈ ×j =iHj,
Ui(g ◦ (σ′i, σ−i)|θi) > Ui(g ◦ (σi, σ−i)|θi).
For any subsets H,H ′ ⊆ Σ, where H ′ ⊆ H, we use the notation H → H ′
(read: H is reduced to H ′) to mean that for any σ ∈ H\H ′, some σi is
3Similar notation will be used for products of other sets.
4Our notation seems to assume that a message space M can be either ﬁnite or countable.
However, we can also handle the case of uncountable M . In doing so, we must impose some
suitable measurability condition on M so that the corresponding strategy space Σi and interim
preferences Ui(g ◦ σ|θi) are well-deﬁned. See Duggan [9] and Serrano and Vohra [15] for this
treatment.
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strictly dominated with respect to H. Let λ0 denote the first element in an
ordinal Λ; let ≥ be the linear order on Λ; and let λ′ denote a successor to
λ in Λ.5 Let {Kλ}λ∈Λ be a ﬁnite, countably inﬁnite, or uncountably inﬁnite
family of subsets of the strategy space Σ satisfying the following properties:
(1) Kλ0 = Σ; (2) Kλ → Kλ′ where Kλ = ⋂λ′′<λKλ′′ for a limit ordinal λ and
any successor λ′; and (3) K∗ ≡ ⋂λ∈ΛKλ → K only for K = K∗.6
Definition 2 (Iterative Dominance) A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ is itera-
tively undominated if σ ∈ K∗.
Remark: The above deﬁnition of iterative dominance allows for eliminat-
ing dominated strategies possibly by using strategies that have previously
been eliminated.7 This is equivalent to the standard deﬁnition of iterative
dominance as long as we consider finite mechanisms. In fact, all the canon-
ical mechanisms proposed by AM, BM and AKS are ﬁnite. Although the
standard deﬁnition of iteratively undominated strategies uses only a count-
ably inﬁnite number of rounds of elimination, we could also allow for an
uncountable number of rounds. This extension is sometimes necessary if we
go beyond ﬁnite mechanisms. Fortunately, even allowing an uncountable
number of rounds of elimination, Chen, Long, and Luo [7] show in their
Theorem 1 that K∗ always exists and is unique (i.e., order independent).
This is true for any mechanism. Hence, K∗ is well deﬁned.
Definition 3 (Exact Implementability) An SCF f is said to be exactly
implementable in iteratively undominated strategies if there exists a mech-
anism Γ = (M,g) such that there exists a unique {σ} = K∗ for which
g(σ(θ)) = f(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ.
Remark: If σ is a unique iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle, we gain
nothing by allowing the agents to use “mixed strategies.” Given the deﬁni-
tion of implementability above, we automatically guarantee the existence of
5An ordinal Λ is a well-ordered set in the order-isomorphic sense. In particular, the well-
ordered set of natural numbers is called the first infinite ordinal. By saying that λ′ is a successor
of λ, we mean that λ′ > λ. A limit ordinal is an element in Λ which is not a successor.
6Although the concepts used here may look complex, the essential idea for iterative dominance
is the same as the case of a countable number of eliminations. The reader is referred to AM [1]
for the countable case of iterative dominance.
7Consider Example 5 of Dufwenberg and Stegeman [8] where there is only one player with
M1 = (0, 1) and u1(x) = x for each x ∈ M1. Following the standard deﬁnition of strict dominance,
every x ∈ (0, 1) can be iteratively undominated, i.e, the outcome induced by iterative dominance
is order dependent. In ﬁnite games, it is well known that a strategy is a Nash equilibrium if it is
the unique outcome of iterative dominance. However, this inﬁnite game has no Nash equilibrium.
If we instead use our deﬁnition of strict dominance, the set of iteratively undominated strategies
is empty, which is consistent with the fact that there is no Nash equilibrium. This is the main
reason why we allow for eliminating dominated strategies possibly by using strategies that have
been previously eliminated.
5
a unique iteratively undominated strategy proﬁle, which is a unique Bayesian
Nash equilibrium as well. This equilibrium is furthermore in pure strategies
(see Chen, Long and Luo [7]).
Consider the following metric on SCFs:
d(f, h) = sup
a∈A,θ∈Θ
|f(a|θ)− h(a|θ)|
The notation f(a|θ) refers to the probability with which f implements a ∈ A
in the state θ.8
Definition 4 (Approximate Implementability) An SCF f is said to be
virtually or approximately implementable in iteratively undominated strate-
gies if, there exists ε¯ > 0 such that for any ε ∈ (0, ε¯], there exists an SCF
f ε for which d(f, f ε) < ε and f ε is exactly implementable in iteratively un-
dominated strategies.
The next standard deﬁnition is very important in the entire economic
theory of information:
Definition 5 (Incentive Compatibility) An SCF f : Θ → Δ(A) is said
to satisfy incentive compatibility if for every i ∈ N, θi, θ′i ∈ Θi,
Ui(f |θi) ≥ Ui(f ; θ′i|θi)
Our deﬁnition of implementability implies implementability in (pure or
mixed) Bayesian (Nash) equilibrium as well. It follows that incentive com-
patibility is necessary for “exact” implementation in iteratively undominated
strategies. By a standard continuity argument, one can easily show that in-
centive compatibility is also necessary for “approximate” implementation in
iteratively undominated strategies. Hence, we have the following:
Proposition 1 If an SCF f is either exactly or approximately implementable
in iteratively undominated strategies, then it satisfies incentive compatibility.
For the next deﬁnition we require some more notation. Let Ψ−i be a
partition of Θ−i. Say that θi is equivalent to θ′i with respect to Ψ−i when
agent i’s interim expected utility under type θi is exactly the same (up to
positive aﬃne transformations) as under type θ′i when evaluating any SCF
that is measurable with respect to Θi ×Ψ−i.
8AM [1] and BM [3] use the 1-norm to measure the distance between two SCFs, while we
use the ∞-norm. However, since we restrict our attention to ﬁnite environments (i.e., the set of
pure alternatives and the type space are both ﬁnite), this change does not make any substantial
diﬀerence.
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Let ρi(θi,Ψ−i) be the set of all elements of Θi that are equivalent to θi
with respect to Ψ−i, and let
Ri(Ψ−i) = {ρi(θi,Ψ−i) ⊂ Θi| θi ∈ Θi} .
Note that Ri(Ψ−i) forms an equivalence class on Θi, that is, it constitutes
a partition of Θi. We deﬁne an inﬁnite sequence of n-tuples of partitions,
{Ψh}∞h=0, where Ψh = ×i∈NΨhi in the following way. For every i ∈ N ,
Ψ0i = {Θi},
and recursively, for every i ∈ N and every h ≥ 1,
Ψhi = Ri(Ψ
h−1
−i ).
Note that for every h ≥ 0, Ψh+1i is the same as, or ﬁner than, Ψhi . Deﬁne
Ψ∗ ≡
∞⋂
h=0
Ψh.
Since Θi is ﬁnite for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a positive integer L such
that ψh = ψL for any h ≥ L. Therefore, at most a ﬁnite number of iterations
in the algorithm suﬃces for determining Ψ∗.
Definition 6 (AM-Measurability) An SCF f is said to satisfy AM-
measurability if it is measurable with respect to Ψ∗.
The following is an important result in AM [1]:
Proposition 2 (AM [1]) If an SCF f is either exactly or approximately
implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, then it satisfies AM-
measurability.
Remark: Although we assume that Θi is ﬁnite, we can extend the above
result to both countably inﬁnite and uncountably inﬁnite Θi. To do so,
we have to allow the use of transﬁnite induction in the AM-measurability
algorithm as we did for the iterative removal procedure of strictly dominated
strategies. See Kunimoto and Serrano [10] for details of this treatment.
To easily check AM-measurability, it is often possible to ﬁnish the al-
gorithm in the ﬁrst iteration. When this happens, we say that the envi-
ronment satisﬁes type diversity. To deﬁne this condition, recall that A =
{a1, . . . , aK}. Deﬁne Uki (θi) to be the interim expected utility of agent i of
type θi for the constant SCF that assigns ak in each state in Θ, i.e.,
Uki (θi) =
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i
qi(θ−i|θi)ui(ak; θi, θ−i).
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Let Ui(θi) = (U1i (θi), . . . , U
K
i (θi)).
Here is the condition of type diversity, as stated in Serrano and Vohra
[14]:
Definition 7 (Type Diversity) An environment E satisfies type diver-
sity (TD) if there do not exist i ∈ N, θi, θ′i ∈ Θi with θi 
= θ
′
i, β ∈ R++
and γ ∈ R such that
Ui(θi) = βUi(θ
′
i) + γe,
where e is the unit vector in RK .
Clearly, under type diversity, the measurability algorithm stops after
the ﬁrst iteration, leading to the ﬁnest partition possible – all types are
separated. As a result, all SCFs satisfy AM-measurability.
In this paper, we restrict attention to a class of mechanisms where for
each agent, there always exists a strategy proﬁle that gives him the highest
payoﬀ in the mechanism.
For every i ∈ N and every partition Ψi, let Σi(Ψi) denote the set of pure
strategies of player i that are measurable with respect to Ψi.
Definition 8 Let Γ = (M,g) be a mechanism. The profile σ ∈ Σ1(Ψ1) ×
· · · × Σn(Ψn) is agent i’s best strategy profile with respect to Ψ if for all
ψi ∈ Ψi, there exists some θi with θi ∈ ψi such that
Ui(g ◦ σ|θi) ≥ Ui(g ◦ σ˜|θi) ∀σ˜ ∈ Σ(Ψ).
Definition 9 (Best Element Property) A mechanism Γ is said to sat-
isfy the best element property if, for each Ψ, for every agent i ∈ N , there
exists a best strategy profile with respect to Ψ.
Remark: See the introduction (speciﬁcally, its third paragraph) for the
implications of the best element property.
3 Restricted Deception-Proofness
This section introduces a new property of SCFs and contains our main result.
Let F be the set of all SCFs.
Definition 10 (Identical Preferences) An environment E satisfies iden-
tical preferences at a nonempty subset of the type space Θˆ ⊆ Θ if there
exists a set Θ0 with the following three properties:
• (1) for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a bijection φi : Θ0 → Θˆi where
Θˆi ⊆ Θi;
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• (2) ∑θ−i∈Θˆ−i qi(θ−i|θi) = 1 for each θi ∈ Θˆi; and
• (3) there exists V : F × Θ0 → R such that for each i ∈ N , there exist
βi > 0 and γi ∈ R for which Ui(·|θi) = βiV (·|φ−1i (θi)) + γi for each
θi ∈ Θˆi.
Property (1) says that, for each agent i ∈ N , there exists a set of types Θˆi
that can be embedded in the common type space Θ0 across agents. Property
(2) says that the event consisting of the n-fold Cartesian product of Θˆ ≡
Θˆ1 × · · · × Θˆn is a belief-closed subspace of Θ. In words, Θˆ can be treated
separately from the rest of the type space. In particular, property (3) says
that interim preferences are identical across agents within Θˆ. Note that
when we consider complete information environments, each Θˆi as well as Θ0
become a singleton.
A deception is a proﬁle of functions, α = (αi)i∈N , where αi : Θi → Θi,
αi(θi) 
= θi for some θi ∈ Θi for some i ∈ N . (Note that the identity function
I : Θ → Θ is not a deception.) For an SCF f and a deception α, f ◦α denotes
the SCF such that for each θ ∈ Θ, [f ◦ α](θ) = f(α(θ)). Let A be the set
of all deceptions union with the identity function on Θ. Note that A can be
considered the entire strategy space Σ of the direct mechanism.
The following is the central deﬁnition of this paper:
Definition 11 (Restricted Deception-Proofness) An SCF f satisfies
the restricted deception-proofness property if, whenever an environment
E satisfies identical preferences at Θˆ, it follows that
Ui(f |θi) = max
α∈A
Ui(f ◦ α|θi)
for each i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θˆi.
Restricted deception-proofness means that, whenever the environment
contains an informational event with identical preferences over the strategic
situation described by the SCF’s direct mechanism, the SCF has a “com-
mon top” property for all types of all agents. Indeed, among all possible
manipulations of the SCF, embodied by all deceptions, no type of any agent
would like to use that coordinated eﬀort to depart from truth-telling. We
shall illustrate the deﬁnition in the next section. Importantly, Bergemann,
Morris, and Tercieux [5] and Serrano and Vohra [14, 15] employ canonical
mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property for their suﬃciency
result if the SCF violates restricted deception-proofness. In those suﬃciency
results, the authors use what we call a stochastic integer game as part of
the construction of the mechanisms where each agent has to announce an
integer; the higher an integer he announces the higher the probability that
he can choose his best outcome; however, no matter how high an integer he
announces, each agent cannot choose his best outcome with probability 1.
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We next present our main result:
Proposition 3 If an SCF f is exactly implementable in iteratively undom-
inated strategies by a mechanism satisfying the best element property, it sat-
isfies restricted deception-proofness.
Remark: The reader is referred to the introduction (speciﬁcally, its fourth
paragraph) which explains why our result needs to qualify the class of mech-
anisms employed.
Proof : Let Γ = (M,g) be an implementing mechanism that satisﬁes the
best element property. Let FΓ be the set of SCFs associated with Γ. That
is,
FΓ =
{
f˜ ∈ F
∣∣∣ f˜ = g ◦ σ for some σ ∈ Σ} .
By our hypothesis of restricted deception-proofness, we consider an en-
vironment satisfying identical preferences at some nonempty belief-closed
subspace Θˆ. Accordingly, we also have the associated common type space
Θ0 and each agent i’s bijection φi : Θ0 → Θˆi. In what follows, we need the
following notation:
HΓ,Θˆ =
{
f˜ ∈ FΓ
∣∣∣∣∣ arg maxf˜∈FΓ V (f˜ |φ−1i (θi)) ∀ θi ∈ Θˆi, ∀i ∈ N
}
;
and
ΣˆΓ,Θˆi =
{
σi ∈ Σi
∣∣∣∣ g ◦ σ ∈ HΓ,Θˆ for some σ−i ∈ Σ−i
}
.
Note that we can guarantee that HΓ,Θˆ 
= ∅ and ΣˆΓ,Θˆi 
= ∅ because the
mechanism Γ satisﬁes the best element property. Deﬁne [Kk
Θˆ
(Σ)]i to be the
set of agent i’s strategies that are k-times iteratively undominated when
every agent’s type space is restricted to the belief-closed subspace Θˆ. Let
[K∗
Θˆ
(Σ)]i be the corresponding strategies that are iteratively undominated.
Let Kk
Θˆ
(Σ) = ×i∈N [KkΘˆ(Σ)]i.9
We claim that ΣˆΓ,Θˆ ⊆ K∗
Θˆ
(Σ). First, observe that ΣˆΓ,Θˆi ⊆ [K0Θˆ(Σ)]i = Σi
for each i ∈ N . We proceed by induction. According to the induction hy-
pothesis, suppose that ΣˆΓ,Θˆ ⊆ Kk
Θˆ
(Σ). Fix agent i arbitrarily. Our induction
hypothesis guarantees that ΣˆΓ,Θˆ−i ⊆ [KkΘˆ(Σ)]−i. Fix also σˆi ∈ Σˆ
Γ,Θˆ
i arbitrarily.
9To save notation, here we only consider a countably inﬁnite number of elimination of strate-
gies. Whenever we need the transﬁnite induction to deal with inﬁnite mechanisms, the induction
argument below can be easily ﬁxed accordingly.
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By the induction hypothesis, there exists σˆ−i ∈ ΣˆΓ,Θˆ−i ⊆ [KkΘˆ(Σ)]−i such
that for any θi ∈ Θˆi,
V (g ◦ (σˆi, σˆ−i)|φ−1i (θi)) ≥ V (g ◦ (σ
′
i, σˆ−i)|φ−1i (θi)),
for any σ
′
i ∈ Σi. This implies ΣˆΓ,Θˆi ⊆ [Kk+1Θˆ (Σ)]i. Since we have identical
preferences at Θˆ, we can conclude that ΣˆΓ,Θˆ ⊆ Kk+1
Θˆ
(Σ). This establishes
that ΣˆΓ,Θˆ ⊆ K∗
Θˆ
(Σ).
Since f is implementable in iteratively undominated strategies, we have
that
g ◦ ΣˆΓ,Θˆ ⊆ g ◦ K∗
Θˆ
(Σ) = (f(θ))θ∈Θˆ.
Therefore, we can choose σˆ ∈ K∗ such that g ◦ σˆ = f and σˆi ∈ ΣˆΓ,Θˆi for all
i ∈ N .
In particular, this implies that f ∈ HΓ,Θˆ, and hence for each θi ∈ Θˆi and
each i ∈ N , we have
V (f |φ−1i (θi)) = V (g ◦ σˆ|φ−1i (θi)) = max
σ∈Σ
V (g ◦ σ|φ−1i (θi)) ≥ max
α∈A
V (f ◦ α|φ−1i (θi)).
Here, the last inequality follows because the set FΓ contains the set of SCFs
associated with the direct mechanism for f (i.e., f itself union with the set of
f ◦ α for all deceptions α). Thus, f satisﬁes restricted deception-proofness.
This completes the proof. .
The next result is a simple, but important extension of the previous one:
Proposition 4 If an SCF f is approximately implementable in iteratively
undominated strategies by a mechanism satisfying the best element property,
it satisfies restricted deception-proofness.
Proof: Let Γε = {((Mεi )i∈N , gε)} denote the implementing mechanism that
satisﬁes the best element property when the approximation is ε > 0. Fix ε¯ >
0 to be small enough and consider the class of such implementing mechanisms
Γ˜ =
⋃
0≤ε≤ε¯ Γε.
Deﬁne
FΓε =
{
f˜ ∈ F∣∣ f˜ = gε ◦ σ for some σ ∈ ΣΓε} ;
and
FΓ = lim sup
ε→0
FΓε .
By our hypothesis of restricted deception-proofness, we consider an en-
vironment satisfying identical preferences at some nonempty subsets of the
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type space Θˆ. Accordingly, we also have the associated common type space
Θ0 and each agent i’s bijection φi : Θ0 → Θˆi.
For each ε ≤ ε¯, let
HΓε,Θˆ =
{
f˜ ∈ FΓε
∣∣∣∣∣ argmaxf˜ V (f˜ |φ−1i (θi)) ∀ θi ∈ Θˆi, ∀i ∈ N
}
;
and
ΣˆΓε,Θˆi =
{
σi ∈ ΣΓεi
∣∣∣∣ gε ◦ σ ∈ HΓε,Θˆ for some σ−i ∈ ΣΓε−i
}
.
Once again, we can guarantee that HΓε,Θˆ 
= ∅ and ΣˆΓε,Θˆi 
= ∅ because the
mechanism Γε satisﬁes the best element property. Deﬁne HΓ,Θˆ and Σˆ
Γ,Θˆ
i
as the limits of HΓε,Θˆ and ΣˆΓε,Θˆi , respectively.
10 With the deﬁnitions so
adapted, the rest of the proof proceeds as the proof of the previous propo-
sition. 
4 Discussion
4.1 An Example
At this point it will be useful to consider an example that ﬁrst appeared in
Palfrey and Srivastava ([13], Example 3) and that was extensively analyzed
in Serrano and Vohra ([14], Section 5).
There are two alternatives, A = {a, b} and three agents. Each agent has
two possible types, Θi = {θa, θb} and each type is drawn independently with
qi(θb) = q for all i and q2 > 0.5. Agents have identical preferences, given by
ui(a, θ) =
{
1 if at least two agents are of type θa
0 otherwise
ui(b, θ) =
{
1 if at least two agents are of type θb
0 otherwise
For each agent, the corresponding interim utilities for the constant SCFs
assigning alternatives a and b are:
Uai (θa) = 1− q2, U bi (θa) = q2,
Uai (θb) = (1− q)2, U bi (θb) = 1− (1− q)2.
Since q2 > 0.5, this implies that U bi (θi) > U
a
i (θi) for all i and θi ∈ Θi.
10We take a sequence along which such limits exist.
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Using this, it can be checked that in this environment, only constant
SCFs satisfy AM-measurability.
For us, what is more interesting now is the modiﬁcation of the example
by adding a third alternative c, which for instance gives a zero payoﬀ to
all agents in all states.11 As argued in Serrano and Vohra [14], the modi-
ﬁed example satisﬁes type diversity, and hence, all SCFs now satisfy AM-
measurability. However, AM’s suﬃciency result cannot be applied to any
non-constant SCF even then.12
We have identiﬁed a new necessary condition for exact or approximate
implementation in iteratively undominated strategies, and we show next that
in the three-alternative example there are SCFs that satisfy incentive com-
patibility and AM-measurability, but that violate the restricted deception-
proofness property. Thus, it is not possible to show a suﬃciency result
for approximate implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by a
mechanism satisfying the best element property. Extra conditions (either on
the environment, like the AM, BM and AKS papers used; or on the SCF
itself) must be imposed.
For instance, let q = 99/100 and consider the following SCF f :
f(θa, θa, θa) = b,
f(θa, θb, θa) = 0.9a + 0.1b,
f(θa, θa, θb) = 0.9a + 0.1b,
f(θb, θa, θa) = 0.9a + 0.1b,
f(θa, θb, θb) = 0.1a + 0.9b,
f(θb, θa, θb) = 0.1a + 0.9b,
f(θb, θb, θa) = 0.1a + 0.9b,
f(θb, θb, θb) = 0.1a + 0.9b.
Noting the fact that all agents have identical preferences, we ﬁrst check
that f satisﬁes incentive compatibility:
Ui(f |θa) = (99/100)20.9 + 2(99/10000)0.9 = 0.89991,
which is strictly greater than
Ui(f, θb|θa) = (1/10000)0.9 + 2(99/10000)0.1 + (99/100)20.9 = 0.88416.
And
Ui(f |θb) = 0.9,
11All that is needed is a third alternative to ensure type diversity. No assumption regarding a
universally bad outcome or anything of that sort is needed here.
12See again the introduction (speciﬁcally, its second paragraph).
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which is strictly greater than
Ui(f, θa|θb) = 2(99/10000)0.1 + (99/100)20.9 = 0.88407.
As can be checked, the environment satisﬁes identical preferences at Θ
(the entire type space) but f violates restricted deception-proofness. Indeed,
consider the deception α such that αi(θa) = αi(θb) = θa for i = 1, 2, 3. Note
that f ◦ α(θ) = b for every θ ∈ Θ. We next compute the interim expected
utilities of each of the two types for this manipulated version of the SCF:
Ui(f ◦ α|θa) = (99/100)2 = 0.9801 > 0.89991 = Ui(f |θa),
and
Ui(f ◦ α|θb) = 1− (1/100)2 = 0.9999 > 0.9 = Ui(f |θb).
So, both types of each agent have an incentive to manipulate the SCF by
using the proposed deception, instead of truth-telling.
Suppose that the SCF f is exactly implementable in iteratively undom-
inated strategies by a mechanism Γ = (M,g) satisfying the best element
property. Since all agents have identical preferences at Θ and the mecha-
nism Γ satisﬁes the best element property, there must exist a strategy proﬁle
σ ∈ Σ such that Ui(g ◦ σ|θi) ≥ maxα˜∈AUi(f ◦ α˜|θi) for any θi ∈ Θi and any
i ∈ N . By our Proposition 3, we have shown that such σ is indeed an it-
eratively undominated strategy proﬁle, i.e., σ ∈ K∗. By our hypothesis of
implementability, we must have Ui(g ◦ σ|θi) = Ui(f |θi) for each θi ∈ Θi and
each i ∈ N . However, this contradicts the fact that, for the deception α of
the previous paragraph, Ui(f ◦ α|θi) > Ui(f |θi) for each θi ∈ Θi and each
i ∈ N .
4.2 The Connection with a Result of Bo¨rgers’s
(1995)
Bo¨rgers [6] shows the following remarkable result under complete informa-
tion:
Theorem [Bo¨rgers [6]] Let f : Θ → A be a deterministic full-range SCF
where |A| ≥ 2. Suppose that every agent has strict preferences over A in
each state θ ∈ Θ. Assume further that the domain of SCFs Θ contains all
possible unanimous strict preferences over A. Then, the SCF f is exactly
implementable in iteratively undominated strategies by a ﬁnite mechanism
if and only if it is dictatorial.
Note that the “if”-part is easy to establish. The striking part of the result
is its the “only if”-part. Assume that an SCF f is exactly implementable
by a ﬁnite mechanism. We can decompose the (only if)-part of the proof
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into the following three steps: (Step 1): f(θ) = a if all agents have identical
preferences at θ with a being the best outcome; (Step 2): For each outcome
a ∈ A, there exists exactly one agent i(a) ∈ N who can either enforce or
exclude outcome a; and (Step 3): i(a) must be the same agent across all
outcomes. Hence, he is a dictator.
Under the full range assumption, our Proposition 3 can be considered an
extension of Step 1 of Bo¨rgers [6] from complete information to incomplete
information. In doing so, we expand the applicability of Bo¨rgers’s argument
in Step 1 to encompass a much richer class of environments: (1) we can
take care of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions over the lottery
space; (2) we can deal with stochastic SCFs; (3) we can include inﬁnite
mechanisms, as long as they satisfy the best element property; and (4) we
can show that the result holds for approximate implementation as well as
exact implementation.
However, the good news stop there. As already pointed out by Bo¨rgers
[6], the use of stochastic mechanisms seems to create real diﬃculties to the
rest of the argument. We have not been able to prove the extension of the
result, but we have not been able to ﬁnd a counterexample either. In this
regard, the connections with Majumdar and Sen [11] and their impossibility
result for ordinally Bayesian incentive compatibility seem quite relevant. We
leave this intriguing issue as an important open question.
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